JOINT CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
FOR
THE AIR FORCE VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT PROGRAM

1. Purpose: This document outlines a concept of operations for commanders to employ the Vulnerability Assessment Team (VAT) and Force Protection Integrated Support Team (FIST). These teams offer commanders both a long-term scheduled antiterrorism/force protection (AT/FP) vulnerability assessment capability through use of the VAT as well as an immediate and follow-on survey capability through use of the FIST. They can be employed individually or together to maximize expertise and capabilities based on the needs of the commander.

2. Mission: Assist commanders by performing on-site assessments/surveys that identify vulnerabilities to terrorist attack. The VAT and FIST make procedural and/or technical recommendations to deter or mitigate the impact of terrorist activity against service members, civilian employees, family members, facilities, information, and mission resources. This gives commanders the capability to evaluate, adjust, or establish AT/FP measures in a peacetime or wartime environment to counter adversaries and threats(s) posed to Air Force personnel and resources. The reach back and follow-on support capability of these teams ensures a commander's AT/FP concerns can be addressed.

3. Background: Force protection is a high profile concern within DoD because of the Khobar Towers terrorist bombing in June 1996, the US Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998, and the recent attack on the USS Cole in October 2000. U.S. national security and our military forces are increasingly vulnerable to the transnational threat of terrorism. People, mission-related facilities, and the support infrastructure all are at risk. The diversity of motives and sponsorship of those perpetrating the threats creates a complex and dynamic challenge for personnel engaged in force protection. The threat of large high explosive bombs is clearly a dramatic and politically potent one, which will continue to exist in the future. The threat from other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological, cannot be overlooked and may well be growing. As a result of the Khobar Towers incident, DoD began its formal program for combating terrorism. Resulting actions included:

?? The CJCS was identified as the focal point and primary advisor to the Secretary of Defense for all DoD force protection issues.

?? J-34, "Deputy Director for Combating Terrorism," was established.

?? DoD and Joint Staff directives, instructions, and handbooks addressing a myriad of antiterrorism/force protection issues were published.

?? Vulnerability assessments were directed.

DoD Directive 2000.12, "DoD Combating Terrorism Program," directs that all Combatant Commanders and the Military Departments institute combating terrorism programs. DoDI 2000.16, Standard 26—Vulnerability Assessment of Installations states, " CINC and/or Service and/or Department of Defense Agencies shall ensure lower level AT programs receive a higher headquarters vulnerability assessment at least once every three years to ensure unity of AT efforts throughout their subordinate commands." The Air Force Vulnerability Assessment Program stood up in the summer of 1998. Vulnerability assessments started in October 1998. The objective of the assessment is twofold: Assess the installation's application of the DoD Standards, and assist the commander in identifying vulnerabilities and options to deter, prevent, or mitigate terrorist attacks. These assessments are usually planned well in advance.

There are however, emergent force protection challenges that commanders face, which sometime require a level of expertise and resources not found at the installation or MAJCOM level. Examples include:

?? The short notice request from CINCUSAFE in September 1997 to perform an AT/FP site survey and vulnerability assessment on Izmir, Turkey

?? A requirement to support Coronet Oak in Panama in January 1999 at the request of 12 AF/CC

?? The deployment to Tirana, Albania in April 1999 to support JTF Shining Hope with Tactical Automated Security Systems (TASS), communications, and tactical vehicle repair expertise.

These deployments were accomplished with ad hoc teams comprised of functional expertise from the Air Force Security Forces Center (AFSFC), Force Protection Battlelab (FPB), 820th Security Forces Group, and 343rd Training Squadron (TRS). These examples illustrated the need to formalize a team of experts to address these AT/FP challenges on a global scale. The FIST was established in October 1999 to provide that capability. The team can respond on short notice to any location and address these challenges through site surveys and provide temporary solutions to mitigate the force protection challenge. The objective of a FIST assessment is to address the immediate AT/FP challenges, ascertain resource availability, recommend alternatives, and employ technology to enhance AT/FP initiatives

4. **Teams Composition:** Both teams offer unique skill sets and an extensive mutual support network in various functional areas of expertise including TASS, physical security, structural and infrastructure engineering, vehicles and equipment, operations readiness, counterintelligence, combat arms, and communications.

    ?? **VAT.** The VAT is composed of a core of eight specialists. Future plans are to configure the VAT in UTC elements. Equipment requirements will be limited to

hand carried items. This number may increase dependent upon unique requirements at the deployed location. Team members include:

- **Team Chief:** Responsible for the overall leadership, management, training, and on-scene performance of the VA team members.

- **Physical Security:** Responsible for the installation, facilities, and personnel security and safety areas.

- **Operations Readiness:** Responsible for assessing plans, procedures, and capabilities for crisis response, consequence management, and recovery operations. A flight surgeon assigned to the team provides a level of knowledge and expertise in all facets of medical readiness and emergency response.

- **Structural Engineering:** Responsible for providing facility damage estimates based on the threat and recommendations to prevent/mitigate the damage.

- **Infrastructure Engineering:** Responsible for assessing the mechanical, electrical, and other service systems, fire, safety, and damage control capability.

- **FIST Member (s):** Responsible for combat arms weapons maintenance and employment; Tactical Automated Security System (TASS) troubleshooting and maintenance; wideband/SATCOM and ground radio communications; and vehicle maintenance. Responsibilities vary according to specialty and contribution to VAT unique considerations.

- **Terrorist Options:** Responsible for viewing and analyzing the installation and security measures from the perspective of a terrorist, and made recommendations to mitigate identified vulnerabilities.

?? **FIST.** The FIST is comprised of 13 core specialist, and configured in UTC element (QFEPL) with an equipment detail tailored to site/mission specific requirements. The team can be tailored to meet specific mission requirements; exact composition, specialties, and numbers will depend a great deal on the site location, in-place resources, and personnel required on site. Team members include:

- **Team Chief:** Responsible for the overall leadership, management, training, and on-scene performance of the FIST team.

- **TASS Specialist:** Responsible for interacting with the installation TASS administrator, or counterpart in addressing TASS employment and performance parameters, troubleshooting problems, mitigating nuisance alarm rate, and training needs.

- **Combat Arms:** Responsible for assisting the combat arms section in resolving weapons employment and maintenance matters with special emphasis on 7-level expertise.

- **Communications:** Responsible for assisting SF managers in resolving complex mobile radio, tactical, and wideband/SATCOM issues that hamper the AT/FP mission.

- **Vehicles and Equipment:** Responsible for interacting with the VCO/VNCO and transportation entity to address local and large scale (MAJCOM) vehicle maintenance related matters that distract from the unit's AT/FP posture.

- **Readiness:** Responsible for assessing plans and supporting documents for AT/FP response and recovery operations, disaster preparedness programs, and gauging unit abilities to integrate and manage WMD response efforts. Can assist unit planners in developing, evaluating, optimizing overarching AT/FP planning.

- **VAT Member (s).** Responsible for assessing the physical security of the installation, facilities, and personnel security and safety areas; infrastructure engineering to include an assessment of mechanical, electrical, fire, and safety systems; structural engineering analysis of facility damage estimates based on threats; and terrorist options analysis of the installation and security measures from the perspective of a terrorist. Responsibilities vary according to specialty and contribution to FIST unique considerations.

5. Capabilities:

?? **VAT.** Provide a multi-disciplined team of military, civil service, and contractors to conduct a vulnerability-based assessment of an installation or agency's AT program on a regularly scheduled basis. The assessment covers as a minimum the following areas:

- AT Plans and Programs

- Counterintelligence, Local Authority Liaison, and Intelligence Support

- AT Physical Security Measures

- Threat and Terrorist Incident Response Measures

- Terrorist use of WMD

- Host Nation, Local Community, Inter-Service, and Tenant Support

?? **FIST.** Provide a multi-functional team to respond on short notice to a location, conduct a comprehensive AT/FP survey tailored to the unique AT/FP challenge, and provide

prudent alternatives/training/technology to the commander to mitigate AT/FP vulnerabilities. An on-call FIST element will be configured and readily available to respond as early as possible to make a "quick look" evaluation of requirements. The follow-on element, with VAT interface, is placed on alert when the on-call element deploys. The follow-on element provides information and mission support as requested from the deployed team to include shipment of equipment or supplies. The follow-on team can also deploy to the site to provide additional support, equipment, and activities as needed. Specific capabilities and assets include:

- Tactical sensors
- Ground and satellite communications
- Logistics support
- Weapons employment and maintenance
- Night observation technology
- AT/FP OPSEC considerations
- Emerging technology
- Modeling and simulations
- AT/FP training

Recommendation(s) weigh prevailing threat information, mission, personnel routines and behaviors, along with unique site requirements and accessibility of physical aids to reduce vulnerabilities. The FIST makes maximum use of commercial transportation sources for equipment/personnel movement unless MILAIR is readily available. With it's organic reach back capability, the FIST in concert with the VAT can solicit expertise from the FPB, AFSFC, Air Intelligence Agency, Air Force Office of Special Investigations, 343 TRS, and area medical and research agencies if necessary to facilitate AT/FP initiatives at the affected site. The team can also act as a test bed for employing emerging technology in addressing AT/FP challenges.

6. Execution:

?? **VAT**. Vulnerability assessments are scheduled through the MAJCOM at least one year in advance. The assessment process is divided into three phases:

- **Phase I (Visit Preparation):** Installations are contacted a minimum of 60 days prior to visits. A request is made for points of contact, an unclassified mission statement, copies of AT/FP, and other installation related plans. The terrorist options specialist provides a classified terrorism threat assessment. Team members contact their respective points of contact prior to the visit.

- ✍ **Phase II (Site Assessment):** On arrival the team requests an overview briefing and tour of the installation or site. The assessment begins with an in-brief to the site commander and his staff. For three and one half days, the team reviews site specific plans, programs, and procedures. Additionally, the team assesses tactical warning actions, THREATCON transition, physical security systems, security forces procedures, incident response, and consequence management capabilities. The assessment will also analyze the effectiveness of blast mitigation and WMD defensive measures. Daily feedback sessions are conducted and are open to installation points of contact. The team structural engineer conducts a tutorial of Antiterrorism Planner, a graphics based computer program used to evaluate facility response to blast. A copy of the software is left with each unit visited.

- ✍ **Phase III (Post Visit):** An out-brief with observations and recommendations is provided to the commander and staff immediately following the assessment. Within 60 days of the assessment, the AFSFC mails the site commander a comprehensive narrative report of the team's findings. Additionally, a copy of the final report is provided to the respective MAJCOM, AF/XOFP, SAF/IGX, and AFRC/ANG (as required).

Over 47 assessments have been conducted since the fall of 1998 at active duty, reserve, air national guard, and field operating agencies and bases.

?? **FIST.** The local commander requests this survey through the MAJCOM/Theater Headquarters to AF/XOF and AFSFC. The survey process is divided into three phases:

- ✍ **Phase I (Visit Preparation):** The FIST point of contact coordinates the visit details with the installation point of contact and other agencies as required

- ✍ **Phase II (Site Survey):** Upon arrival, the team leader will provide an in-brief to the commander, staff, and designated technical representatives. The team requests a familiarization briefing/tour of the installation or site. The team then conducts a comprehensive survey tailored to the emergent AT/FP challenge identified. Immediate fixes are applied when possible.

- ✍ **Phase III (Post Visit):** A summary report listing observations and recommendations is left with the commander at the end of the survey. A copy of the report is maintained by the AFSFC. Follow-on assistance is provided as required.

Eighteen surveys and site visits have been conducted since April 1999 in USAFE, PACAF, and SOUTHAF AORs and three classified locations.

7. Training: Team member training is divided into two phases:

?? **Initial Certification:** Team members should receive the following training prior to conducting assessments/surveys:

- ✍ Level I Antiterrorism Awareness Training
- ✍ Level II Antiterrorism Responsible Officer Training
- ✍ Dynamics of International Terrorism Course
- ✍ Over-the-shoulder with Joint Service Installation Vulnerability Assessment (JSIVA) or AFSFC VAT/FIST
- ✍ TASS Training, Ground Combat Skills Level II and Air Base Defense Command Course (FIST)
- ✍ Combating Terrorism on Military Installations
- ✍ Risk Management
- ✍ Recurring training as directed. Each position requires extensive knowledge and specialization to ensure both team and personal integrity and credibility be maintained. Recurring training is an ongoing process. VAT/FIST members and support staff will work together to identify training needs based upon new technologies and techniques, and the ever increasing terrorist threat. As a minimum, each team member should attend/complete one professional development course/seminar annually.

8. Operations Support:

- ?? Maintain VAT/FIST Schedule
- ?? Maintain contact with Defense Threat Reduction Agency and sister services on assessment program issues
- ?? Manage teams training program
- ?? Manage an e-mail or phone help line to respond to questions/inquiries from the field on any AT/FP issue, question, or concern
- ?? Coordinate with the Air Force Force Protection Battlelab and the AFSFC Requirements Branch on emerging technology
- ?? Track assessment trends and best practices and disseminate to MAJCOMs and team members

9. Conclusion: VAT and FIST operations under the Air Force Security Forces Center, Force Protection Division, enhance the Air Force capability to respond to AT/FP issues and concerns worldwide. Both teams, collectively or individually offer skill sets to conduct comprehensive

AT/FP assessments/surveys, and provide prudent AT/FP alternatives, plans, training, and technology to the commander to help deter and mitigate AT/FP vulnerabilities.